महत्वपूर्ण निर्णय सारांश

Meaning of the Poem and Lack of Offence

The Court, after carefully analysing the Urdu text and its English translation (¶9), concluded that the poem “has nothing to do with any religion, community, region or race” (¶10(a)). It neither affects national integration nor jeopardizes sovereignty, unity, or integrity of India (¶10(b), (c)). The Court emphasized that the poem “preaches non-violence” and encourages meeting injustice with love and sacrifice, not by resorting to violence (¶10(f), ¶10(h)). It noted that the reference to the "throne" was symbolic and denoted resistance against injustice rather than incitement against any community (¶10(g)).

No Ingredients of Offences Made Out

The Court exhaustively examined the ingredients of Section 196 of the BNS (¶13-14) and observed that the poem did not promote disharmony, hatred, or ill-will between religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups. The poem neither disturbed public tranquility nor sought to create disharmony (¶14). The offence under Section 197 was also ruled out as there was no assertion or imputation against any religious, racial, language, regional group, caste, or community (¶16). The Court found the invocation of Section 299 “ridiculous” (¶17), as the poem did not outrage religious feelings or insult religious beliefs. Similarly, the allegation under Section 302, requiring deliberate intention to wound religious feelings, was found wholly baseless (¶18). Section 57 concerning abetment by the public was found to have no nexus, as there was no act of abetment proved or alleged (¶19).

Duty to Respect Freedom of Speech and Role of Preliminary Inquiry under BNSS

The Court stressed that where allegations concern spoken or written words potentially attracting the exception under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, the police must exercise particular care and undertake preliminary inquiry (¶30). The obligation of the police to respect constitutional ideals under Article 51-A(a) was highlighted (¶29).

Standard to Judge Alleged Offensive Speech

Quoting the paragraph 67 of the judgment authored by Bose and Puranik, JJ in Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government, C.P. & Berar (1946 SCC OnLine MP 5), the Court held that the effect of words must be judged “using the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds” (¶32-33).
The Court reaffirmed that the poem, viewed from this standard, did not incite hatred or enmity and in fact promoted resilience against injustice through peaceful means.

Requirement of Mens Rea

The Court reiterated that mens rea is an essential ingredient for offences under Section 196, following its earlier decisions in Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 5 SCC 1 and Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya (2021) 15 SCC 35 (¶34).
It held that there was no deliberate intention on part of the appellant to promote enmity or ill-will, and thus, even on prima facie basis, the necessary mens rea was absent.
The Court severely criticized the High Court for failing to appreciate the fundamental constitutional protection of freedom of speech (¶35-37). It noted that the High Court wrongly relied on the "nascent stage of investigation" to refuse quashing the FIR despite no prima facie case being made out. It reaffirmed that Courts can and must quash proceedings at the initial stage itself to prevent abuse of process (¶37).

Importance of Protecting Freedom of Expression

constitutional value (¶40-41).

The Court summarized in ¶42-44 that Section 173(3) of BNSS permits preliminary inquiry even where a cognizable offence is disclosed if the punishment is between three to seven years. The police must act sensitively in such matters, particularly where free speech under Article 19(1)(a) is concerned. The Court emphasized that registration of FIRs based on speech must not stifle fundamental freedoms unless reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) are genuinely attracted.

Prepared by Iram Jan

Communications Division|  Supreme Court of India

© Supreme Court of India

The Petitioner, a member of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (“RJD”), filed a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India to challenge his expulsion from the Bihar Legislative Council (“BLC”). The Petitioner was alleged of unparliamentary conduct during the Governor’s address on 13 February  2024. Specifically, he and another Member of the Legislative Council (“MLC”), Md. Sohaib, disrupted the proceedings by using derogatory slogans and mimicking the Chief Minister. A formal complaint was lodged against them on 19 February  2024, leading the BLC Chairman to refer the matter to the Ethics Committee for inquiry. The Ethics Committee scheduled an inquiry for 3 May  2024, which Md. Sohaib attended, expressing regret. However, the Petitioner repeatedly sought exemptions, claiming  engagements related to the Lok Sabha elections and other commitments.

He finally appeared before the Ethics Committee on 12 June 2024, but challenged the committee's authority rather than addressing the charges. The Ethics Committee then pre-poned their meeting from 19 June 2024 to 14 June 2024, without notifying the Petitioner, and concluded the proceedings. The Ethics Committee submitted its report on 14 June  2024, recommending the Petitioner's expulsion and Md. Sohaib's suspension for the first two days of the 208th Session of the House.

On 26 July  2024, the BLC adopted the report, leading to the Petitioner’s expulsion and Md. Sohaib’s suspension. Subsequently, on 26 July 2024, the BLC Secretariat issued a notification formally relieving the Petitioner of his membership. During the petition's pendency, the Election Commission of India declared a bye-election for the vacant seat on 30 December  2024, with the process to conclude by 25 January 2025. The Supreme Court then stayed the declaration of the bye-election result on 15 January  2025.

The Division Bench (two judges) of the Supreme Court quashed the punishment of  expulsion of the Petitioner from the BLC for being disproportionate and excessive.The Court held that the  prohibition under Article 212(1) only bars Constitutional Courts from reviewing the legislative proceedings for procedural irregularity. However, it does not prevent the judicial review of the legality or constitutionality of the legislature's actions (both lawmaking and administrative decisions). The judgement of the Court was authored by Justice Kant. 

Reasons for the Decision:

Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 212(1) and Judicial Review of Ethics Committee Proceedings
The Supreme Court rejected the objection to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 212(1) of the Constitution, which bars judicial scrutiny of procedural irregularities in “Proceedings in the Legislature”. The Court reasoned that Article 212(1) protects only the formal steps and debates within the House (motions, deliberations etc.) from judicial inquiry but does not shield legislative decisions or administrative actions (¶¶10-14, ¶23). The Ethics Committee’s recommendation for the Petitioner’s expulsion was deemed an administrative function under Rules framed under Article 208, aimed at enforcing discipline, and not a “proceeding” or “legislative decision” (¶¶17-18). The Court held that  such administrative actions, even by legislative bodies, are subject to judicial review if they infringe fundamental rights, lack constitutional authority, or are arbitrary (¶¶19-20). The Court ruled that expulsion impacted the  fundamental rights of the petitioner and representative governance, necessitating judicial scrutiny of its legality and proportionality (¶¶21-22).

Proportionality of Punishment Imposed by the House
The Supreme Court held that Constitutional Courts can examine the proportionality of punishments imposed by legislative bodies. The doctrine of proportionality requires that punitive measures be necessary, balanced, and the least restrictive means to achieve disciplinary objectives (¶¶25-26, ¶62). The Court reasoned that expulsion, being a grave measure, must be reserved for exceptional cases and account for its impact on democratic representation (¶¶57-59). The Court outlined guiding factors for assessing proportionality, including: (i) the degree of obstruction caused by the member; (ii) whether the conduct harmed the House’s dignity; (iii) the member’s prior and subsequent conduct (remorse); (iv) availability of lesser penalties; and (v) balancing societal interests, such as the electorate’s right to representation (¶64). The Court held that while Constitutional Courts must defer to legislative autonomy, they must intervene if the punishment is manifestly disproportionate or shocks constitutional conscience (¶61).

Power of the Supreme Court to Determine Quantum of Punishment under Article 142
The Supreme Court reasoned  that while judicial restraint ordinarily requires courts to remit matters of punishment to disciplinary authorities, Article 142 empowers it to substitute the punishment in exceptional cases to ensure “complete justice” (¶¶79-81). The Court ruled   that remanding the matter to the Ethics Committee for reconsideration would result in protracted proceedings, depriving the Petitioner of participation in legislative sessions and exacerbating the infringement of his fundamental rights under Article 14 (¶¶82-83). The Court found that the Petitioner had already undergone seven months of expulsion, with his term set to expire in 2026, leaving limited time for representation (¶82).The Supreme  Court therefore modified the punishment by Invoking Article 142, deeming the period of expulsion already served as equivalent to suspension, which it held was proportionate to the misconduct (¶86). 

The Supreme Court reinstated the Petitioner as a member of the Bihar Legislative Council with immediate effect but barred him from claiming remuneration for the expulsion period. The Court clarified that this modification did not condone the Petitioner’s conduct and warned against future misconduct (¶¶86-87). As a result, the Press Note dated 30.12.2024 issued by Election Commission, declaring the bye-election for the seat earlier held by the Petitioner was quashed, and all actions following it were annulled.

Prepared by Osama Noor and Raza Zaidi

Centre for Research and Planning |  Supreme Court of India 

© Supreme Court of India

Vihaan Kumar (“Appellant”), was arrested on 10 June 2024 for offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The Appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution  before the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging his arrest as illegal, which was dismissed on 30 August 2024.  Consequently, he appealed before the Supreme Court. The Appellant claimed that he was arrested at 10:30 AM on 10 June 2024 and produced before a magistrate on 11 June 2024 at 3:30 PM, alleging a violation of Article 22(2) (failure to produce within 24 hours). He further contended that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him, breaching Article 22(1). The State, however, asserted that the arrest occurred at 6:00 PM on 10 June 2024, complying with the 24-hour rule, and that the grounds were orally communicated.

A critical additional grievance arose when the Appellant, after arrest, was hospitalized at PGIMS, Rohtak, where he was handcuffed and chained to a hospital bed. Photographic evidence corroborated this treatment, prompting the Supreme Court to issue notices to the hospital and police authorities. The State later suspended the involved officers and initiated a departmental inquiry.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, declaring the Appellant’s arrest illegal due to non-compliance with Article 22(1). The Court ordered the Appellant’s immediate release, quashed all subsequent remand orders, and directed the State of Haryana to issue guidelines prohibiting the handcuffing of accused persons in hospitals. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Oka. Justice Singh authored a concurring opinion.

Violation of Article 22(1): Failure to Communicate Grounds of Arrest
The Supreme Court held  that Article 22(1) mandates that an arrested person be informed of the grounds of arrest “as soon as may be,” ensuring the ability to challenge detention and seek legal remedies. The Court referred to Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India 2023 INSC 866 and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2024 INSC 414 and held  that communication of grounds must be meaningful and effective, preferably in writing, to avoid disputes. While Article 22(1) does not explicitly require written communication, the Court ruled that vague assertions or oral claims by police are insufficient (¶¶11-14). 

The Appellant’s petition specifically pleaded non-communication of grounds of arrest, which the State failed to counter in its affidavits. Instead, the State claimed the Appellant’s wife was informed, which the Supreme Court dismissed as irrelevant to constitutional compliance (¶¶22-24). The State’s reliance on a case diary entry (recording communication of grounds at 6:10 PM) was rejected by the Court as an “afterthought” due to the absence of contemporaneous documentation of the actual grounds (¶27). The Court reasoned that the burden to prove compliance lies on the State, and mere diary entries without detailing the grounds were deemed inadequate. The Court thus held that non-compliance with Article 22(1) vitiated the arrest, rendering all subsequent custody unlawful (¶22-28).

 Violation of Article 21: Handcuffing and Chaining to Hospital Bed
The Supreme Court condemned the Appellant’s treatment as a gross violation of dignity under Article 21. The Court found the handcuffing and chaining to a hospital bed without justification shocking and unconstitutional. The Court directed the State to issue guidelines to prevent such practices, emphasizing that custodial treatment must respect human dignity (¶29).

 Effect of Subsequent Legal Processes
The State argued that the filing of a chargesheet validated the Appellant’s custody. The Supreme  Court rejected this and held that constitutional violations at the arrest stage cannot be cured by subsequent procedures. The Court reasoned that once an arrest is vitiated under Article 22(1), continued detention based on remand orders or trial proceedings remains unlawful (¶16).

Justice Singh in his concurring opinion, reinforced Justice Oka’s conclusions while elaborating on the constitutional and statutory imperatives underpinning the communication of grounds of arrest. He reasoned  that the mandate of Article 22(1) — requiring arrested persons to be informed of the grounds of arrest — is not merely procedural but a fundamental safeguard to protect liberty under Article 21. Justice Singh  ruled  that written communication of grounds is essential to ensure the arrestee can meaningfully challenge detention and seek legal remedies. Justice Singh further noted that statutory provisions such as Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”)  (Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) and Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 operationalize this constitutional right, making non-compliance a fatal illegality (J. Singh ¶2).

Justice Singh expanded on the role of Section 50A of the CrPC, which obligates authorities to inform the arrestee’s relatives or nominated persons about the arrest and its grounds. He reasoned that this requirement  was not a “mere formality” but a critical mechanism to enable the arrestee’s circle to act swiftly — such as arranging legal aid or bail — to actualize the right to liberty. By linking this statutory duty to Article 21, Justice Singh held that the failure to communicate grounds in writing to both the arrestee and their representatives undermines the very purpose of constitutional safeguards, rendering the arrest unlawful (J. Singh ¶3).

Prepared by Osama Noor 

Centre for Research and Planning |  Supreme Court of India 

© Supreme Court of India

Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. (INSCO) challenged the approval of a Resolution Plan submitted by AGI Greenpac Ltd. for the acquisition of Hindustan National Glass and Industries Ltd. (HNGIL), a major player in the glass packaging industry. HNGIL, undergoing insolvency proceedings under the IBC, had invited resolution applicants, with both INSCO and AGI Greenpac submitting their respective plans.

A key issue arose when AGI Greenpac's Resolution Plan was approved by the CoC on 28.10.2022 with 98% votes, despite lacking prior approval from the CCI. INSCO contended that such approval was mandatory under Section 31(4) of the IBC, especially in cases involving combinations under the Competition Act, 2002. NCLAT ruled that while CCI approval was mandatory, its timing—whether before or after CoC approval—was directory, thus upholding AGI Greenpac's approval. INSCO challenged this ruling before the Supreme Court.

Section 23 of the Act states that if the person who received property fails to take care of the giver, the transfer can be canceled, as if it were obtained by fraud or force. A Gift Deed was executed by the mother in favour of her son on 7 September 2019 of  the  property which she had  purchased on 23 January 1968. The Deed stated that the son would maintain the mother  and the same was registered on 9 September 2019. Allegedly, the same day a vachan patra/promissory note was executed by the son stating  that he will take care of the mother and father till the end of their life and if he does not do so, the mother will be at liberty to take back the Gift Deed. 

On 24 December 2020 the mother filed an application under the Section 23 of the Act before the Sub Divisional Magistrate alleging attacks by the son regarding  the further transfer of property, and sought cancellation of the Deed as there was no love and affection left between the parties. This application was allowed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate  and the deed was declared null and void (not valid in law). However, the son preferred an appeal which was dismissed on 25 April 2022 by the Collector. Subsequently, the son  filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. A Single-Judge Bench upheld the order of the Collector and dismissed the writ petition. The son then filed a writ appeal, and a Division-Bench of the High Court reversed the order of the Single-Judge  and found  the deed valid. Consequently, the mother filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.

A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Single-Judge Bench of the High Court and the authorities  below and cancelled the Gift Deed because the conditions in the gift were not complied with. The Court also ruled  that the authorities while exercising jurisdiction under the Section 23 of the Act can order possession to be transferred. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Karol. 

Liberal interpretation of the Act

The Supreme Court held that the objective of the Act is to  empower senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to the condition of being maintained by the transferee (¶25). The Court referred to K. H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, (2019 INSC 1100), in which it was held  that the provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be interpreted with a purpose-oriented approach and the problem that a statute was designed to remedy should first be identified and then a meaning  that resolves the problem should be adopted (¶9). 

The Supreme Court ruled that the Statement of Object and Reasons and Preamble of the Act embodies  the intent of the Act which is to ensure effective maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens, guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution (¶12). Therefore, the Act is a beneficial legislation  aimed at securing the rights of senior citizens in view of the challenges faced by them and must be given a liberal meaning to it (¶14).  The Court observed  that it is the social obligation of the children to maintain their parents when they need them and it is bound by the Constitution to advance the cause of social justice pertaining to maintenance of parents or wife (¶¶15-16).

Application of Section 23 of the Act

The Supreme Court, after scrutinizing the Gift Deed and Promissory Note, held that the two ingredients necessary for the application of the Section 23, as propounded in Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi, (2022 INSC 1257), i.e., the transfer should have a condition attached to it regarding maintenance and basic needs, and the transferee has failed to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor, were fulfilled in the present case. The Supreme Court thus held that both documents had a condition of maintenance of the mother by the son, which was not honored (¶¶ 20-23).

The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the Act is to provide speedy, simple, and inexpensive remedies for the elderly, and therefore the authorities under the Section 23 of the Act have the power to order eviction and grant possession of the property to the concerned senior citizens (¶24).

Prepared By: Rudrakshi Sharma (Intern) 

Centre for Research and Planning, Supreme Court of India